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MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF
AMERICAN PRISIONERS OF WAR
HELD BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Robert J. Naughton
Introduction. January 1973 witnessed the end of the longest continual
armed conflict in the 200-year history
of the United States. Sixty days after
the signing of the Paris agreement, the
longest recorded incarceration of American prisoners of war (POW's) ended for
more than 500 men, over 450 of whom
had been held in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Several of these
men had endured more than 8 years as
prisoners of the DRV, while one POW
held by the Vietcong was detained over
9 years.
The POW's received a warm and
tumultuous welcome from the people of
the United States. This served to create
a unanimity among Americans which
had been lacking during the long years
of the Vietnam conflict. The Nation's
public display of pride and relief was a

genuine show of interest and concern
for "their" POW's.
The Vietnam POW's, however, were
not the irrst prisoners of war who had
received publicity. Those American men
who had been held prisoners in all
recent wars have been the subject of
public examination, and their return to
the United States has provided a great
deal of human interest news copy.
The post-Korean period was the most
lucid example of such investigation.
Eugene Kinkead's widely read book, In
Every War But One, based on
The source material for this article is
drawn from the author's 6 years of imprisonment in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
-his experience and observations plus the
narratives and reflections of 118 other pris·
oners with whom he, at various times, shared
a cell.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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psychological factors that influenced
the prisoners, emphasized the poor conduct of American POW's in Korea.
Similar works combined with the conclusions reached in the Secretary of
Defense Advisory Committee POW
Report prompted the issuance of the
Executive Order Code of Conduct. The
perceived necessity for an executive
order delineating the expected standard
of conduct for POW's was a de facto
condemnation of Korean POW's. For
the many U.S. servicemen who served
honorably as POW's in Korea, it is
unfortunate that the books defending
their conduct, such as March to Calumny, received less notoriety than those
which condemned, but the intent here is
not to debate the guilt stigma of Korean
POW's nor to exonerate the innocent.
Instead, it will be enough to note that
such writings do exist.
Now there exists another group of
subjects, the Vietnam prisoners, whose
experiences might substantiate, repudiate, or expand upon the findings of
the studies of prisoners held in previous
wars. A military examination of the
Code of Conduct's influence on Vietnam's POW's and its further applications, a psychological investigation into
the personality effects of from 6 to 9
years of foreign detention, and the
sociological problems involved in living
5 years with the same man under
adverse stress conditions should be of
intense interest for research. Indeed, the
findings would be of value not only to
military leaders and behavioral scientists
but to any human beings who have
more than a casual curiosity toward
their fellow man.
No amount of descriptive words can
completely peel back the skin of the
POW and reveal his inner self. But
perhaps an acquaintance with the confmed environment in which a POW must
survive and some insight into the
methods by which a man copes with
this situation will help the reader better
understand his actions.

A prisoner's world is subject to a
variety of influences, both internal and
external, influences that can cause a
man's perceptions to expand and contract as the situation changes. Hence,
conscious acts, willful choices, and resistance motivations have shifting roots
within a prisoner. For example, the
rationale of a new captive differs from
that of a man hardened by years of
prison life; a consuming injury can alter
one's outlook, and resistance with group
support is not the same as standing
alone. The expansion of individual experiences to general behavioral axioms
by which motives are assigned to all
POW's is inherently dangerous, but
some factors of resistance behavior are
universal. Such general propositions
observed to be true are examined in this
paper.
Capture and Interrogation. Consider,
if you will, a pilot in the relative safety
of a smooth flying jet aircraft with the
comforts of a CVA "ready room II fresh
in his mind. Suddenly he finds himself
huddling in a flooded rice paddy-still
shaken by the combined effects of his
aircraft being hit, abrupt ejection, and
an unwanted parachute descent to
earth-"skivvie-clad" and tightly bound
amidst a crowd of angry, club-waving
Vietnamese peasants, screaming in a
language unintelligible to him. He is
now a prisoner of war!
When such events occur in staccato
fashion within 15 to 20 ririnutes, they
represent an abrupt, disconcerting
change. The most dominant emotion is
a sense of bewildering fear at the alien
surroundings and uncertainty of one's
ultimate fate. Things held dear-friends,
home, and family-take on greater importance when they are no longer accessible. Embodied in this sense of loss is
the uncertainty of time. How long?
Ever?
Throughout captivity, this or some
other form of fear is a prisoner's constant companion, always capable of
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influencing his behavior. It is more
accurate to say that in the years ahead
the POW will learn to control his fear
rather than conquer it.
Behavior at such a time is patterned
largely by instinct-one acts as a programed individual and military man.
Such programing is attributable to information bits acquired through age,
cultural experiences, and training. That
one's actions are instinctive means that
resistance efforts draw on learning and
values formulated earlier in life. For
example, past survival school training
and the ingrained k,nowledge that the
Code of Conduct is the order of the day
embody the spirit of resistance and give
a man an instinctive modus operandi
from the outset of captivity.
The POW soon comes to realize that
this patterned, instinctive reaction to
events is his only guide on what to do
next. He is alone, a helpless object
vulnerable to the enemy's wrath. One
manifestation of the subconscious loneliness is the relief one feels when an
American aircraft passes overhead. This
nostalgia and sense of kinship with
other pilots was experienced by U.S.
POW's in Hanoi during every bombing
raid from May 1967 to April 1968, a
brief respite from the gnawing loneliness
inside each prisoner of war.
The impact of this loneliness is further intensified as the POW comes to
realize that his programed, instinctive
reactions will not cover every situation.
He understands that at some point he
must consciously deal with the question
of how to relieve the constant pain of
the binding ropes-without giving the
inquisitors any information.
Resolving the dilemma of resistance
and survival is exacerbated by the strict
rules that prevail in the captor-captive
relationship. It is unlikely that an
American prisoner has previously been
involved in a contest in which the stakes
have been so high and the regulations so
invariable. A man's life in the United
States is a series of second chances,

getting a break, or receiving a helping
hand. But in a Hanoi interrogation cell,
such relief does not occur. Here there is
no chance that someone will enter the
sweat-stained room with bumpy walls
designed to muffle screams and say,
"We will let you go this time, but don't
do it again."
Some would attribute the captive's
resistance to loyalty or devotion to
duty; and, in later periods of POW life,
devotion to duty and patriotism may be
an accurate description of resistance
motivation. However, in the early days
of captivity, pride is a more correct
motivational assessment. Pride is a
driving desire to prove yourself to yourself and to those whose opinion you
respect, and so strong is this desire for
self-respect that many have endured
torture to the point of crippling pain.
The combination of pride and obligation seems to motivate men, time and
time again, to resist to the limit of their
endurance-despite the knowledge that
the prisoner will probably be forced to
conform in the long run.
It is important to note that physical
well-being as well as mental resolve
influence a prisoner's conduct. Strong
physiological needs are always present
for a POW. Some men crave water even
before their parachutes· deliver them to
earth, and several sweltering days without washing, plus involuntary immersion in rice paddy water with a human
excrement additive, produce an almost
maniacal desire for a bath. For many
men, maimed in the course of capture,
physiological priorities center on injuries and a struggle to stay alive. Still,
men with twisted legs, shattered arms,
crushed faces, and flame-charred bodies
do resist from the outset rather than
seek aid by compromising their principles. But such action is beyond the
ordinary and cannot be expected from
all. It is a strong motivation that induces
a physically disabled man to select the
arduous course of action because of
what he knows is expected of him.
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It has been stated that initial behavior is instinctive. Instinct is used here
in the classical sensei in that the newness of the environment dictates "trial
and error" or "best guess" behavior
based on innate feelings. However, as
the years of prison transform new captives into oldtimers, and the bitter
lessons are learned, a man is better able
to determine proper courses of action.
His actions are still instinctive in the
sense that behavior is limited by the
goals perceived as attainable, 2 This
prison maturity replaces earlier guesswork, thereby enabling a POW to recognize the frequent fluctuations in the
captor's attitude and take advantage of
these changes for his own benefit.

Living Alone. The new captive is first
thrust into another completely new and
unnatural environment, that of living in
solitary confinement. Few people have"
ever lived for any length of time without any form of human companionship.
Both U.S. penal institutions and the
1949 Geneva Conventions on Prisoner
of War Treatment set 30 days of solitary
as maximum punishment. A poll of U.S.
POW's captured in the DRV before
1969 reveals that 90 percent of the men
endured solitary living conditions for
periods ranging from a few days to more
than 4 years, and an equal percentage
had been subjected to physical torture.
Men of varied personalities are affected
by "solo" living in different ways. The
combination of emotional stresses and
physical hardships prompts hallucinations within some new prisoners. Some
memories of the first days in Hanoi are
confused and dotted with haunting
recollections of irrational outbursts and
disturbing dreams.
The physical condition of the cells
within what became known as the
"Hanoi Hilton" contributes to the depressive state of a new POW. An 8-foot
by 8-foot concrete room, bare board
bunks, a heavy, iron-braced door with a
shuttered peephole, and a small barred

window looking onto a wall crowned
with broken bottles comprise the appointments of his new home. The daily
schedule is quickly learned, and the two
meals do not fill the endless hours of a
prisoner's day. To a "solo" prisoner, the
daily fare of two meals has more value
as a relief from boredom than as
nourishment. Even the sporadic bathing
schedule provides a welcome respite
from the oppressing heat of one's cell if
little else. A POW's bath entails dipping
cold water from a tank resembling a
horse trough and spreading it over one's
body by means of a cup.
The sound of the turnkey opening
doors usually announces the time to eat
or bathe, but the rattle of keys at an
unscheduled time often means he will
be called to a quiz. * Quizzes usually
mean being called upon to do something
against one's will, and there is a feeling
of relief when the jingle of keys fades
into the distance or when another's
door is opened.
It ought not to be surprising that in
this isolated existence a POW seeks
some contact with familiarity wherever
he can find it. Something so innocuous
as smoking a cigarette provides a feeling
of security in that the act of smoking is
a familiar experience, and, to one who
has tried a Vietnamese cigarette, it is
obvious that an ulterior motive is required to enjoy it.
The pleasure derived from such
familiar associations indicates the POW's
desire to conquer his alien environment
and to gain control of his emotions.
Since knowledge is the armor by which
we arm ourselves against adversity, a
prisoner constantly strives to learn
about his surroundings. Thus, the physical camp layout, the guard change
schedule, and the turnkey's idiosyn*The term "quiz" was coined by POW's to
denote prisoner meetings with some Vietna·
mese representative of the camp organization.
Quizzes could entail interrogation, propaganda, discipline, torture, or indoctrination.
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crasies are all objects of study. A person
knows he operates better in familiar
surroundings or when he possesses the
"home court" advantage. The POW subconsciously realizes that action under
extreme emotional stress provides a
poor basis for rational behavior. He is
motivated to establish a better platform
from which to act.
A universal activity of solo POW's is
to peer through cracks, under doors, or
through the bars in the hope of seeing
another POW. Despite Vietnamese efforts to avoid even sight contact between Americans, a fleeting glimpse is
occasionally available as a Yank shuffles
from his cell to a quiz or to pick up his
chow. Eventually the day comes when
an "old head" is able to communicate
with the "new" man. By means of a few
well chosen wor;ds, spoken or written,
the new man is given the tap code used
for clandestine communication among
POW's, advice on prison pitfalls, words
of encouragement, and the senior officer's policy of resistance, called
BACK-US.* This information is passed
at great risk to the transmitter, for the
camp maintains strict regulations against
communication enforced by guards
roaming the halls of the Hanoi Hilton
who report even suspected violations to
camp officers. To be caught means
severe torture, as many prisoners would
learn during the communication purges.
A man named Ho Chi Minh once
said, "Communication is the lifeblood
of resistance." The impact of communicating is precisely that for the
*BACK-US was an acronym which con·
tained the essence of the senior officer's
resistance policy in the Little Vegas area of
the Hanoi Hilton in 1967. Each letter repre·
sented the following:
B-don't Bow when in front of cameras.
A-stay off the Air, i.e., don't read on
camp radi;.'
C-you are not a Criminal.
K-don't ,!gss theVietnamese goodby by
making good statements when we
leave.
US-gnity before.§.elf.

POW. For some POW's, covert communication is their sole contact with
others over a period of months and
years. Any device capable of making
noise may be used to transmit information from the highest priority to idle
chatter to pass the time and combat
loneliness.
A man in solitary with only rats for
roommates also spends a great deal of
time involved in introspection. His attitude is a poignant mixture of feeling
sorry for himself and seeing himself as
one with a duty to perform. Thoughts
center on assessing one's situation, prospects, and the dilemma of how to exist, a
dilemma which prevails for years. Reflections on the war are subject to the
constant Vietnamese propaganda which
the camp authorities provide through a
crude wooden encased radio speaker in
the window. Fortunately for the POW,
the broadcasts are very naive and intended for someone with no more than a
seventh grade education or the right
psychological set.
'the POW's attempt to evaluate his
situation prompts a circular reasoning
that meanders through the present, past,
back to the present, and ultimately to
the future. When one accurately assesses
the war, as he knew it prior to being
shot down, certain questions begin
cropping up: Who really cares about
POW's? How often does anybody think
of one who is a POW? What reasons are
there to expect the war to end in 1, 2,
3 ... years?
The biggest question a POW poses to
himself is, "How would I live my life if I
were to live it over again?" To answer
such a question, a man recalls many
events and decisions of his past life and
how alternate decisions might have altered his present circumstances. A mental playback of the events leading to his
capture provides hours of speCUlative
thought as to what went wrong. Pondering the decisions made earlier in life
raises a fantasy of foregone occupations.
The life of a schoolteacher, a business-
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man, or an airline pilot now seems to
have greater appeal; and when one
dwells on his past, thoughts linger on
pleasant memories reconstructed in fine
detail. Ultimately the question, "Why
was that particular event enjoyable or
important?" causes one to evaluate
himself and ask, "What is important?
What do I value?"
The surfacing of values, the examining of past goals, and the facing of
the reality of a prisoner of war situation
lead most POW's to consider the
dilemma of the present, the guilt felt by
each man who has been forced to act
against his will during initial interrogations. Before talking to other POW's,
each man perceives himself to be the
only one who has given information.
But every man knows he cannot endure
the Vietnamese rope torture indefinitely
without giving some information. The
natural outcome of this thought process
is to form a workable plan for the
future, namely, a motivational force to
resist, to honorably survive the trials
that lie ahead.
The early solitary period of captivity
is marked by a high frequency of
quizzes, intended largely to determine
what type of prisoner a new man might
become. Thus, there is ample opportunity for the prisoner to employ his
newly devised plan of intended action.
One is always, on these occasions, taken
from his cell to a designated room to be
quizzed alone, with only his convictions
for support. One might say the general
POW attitude at quiz, knowing one can
be forced to comply is never to give
"something for nothing." It is a point of
pride that no information is given as
long as the prisoner is capable of resistance.
Each prisoner formed his own judgment of tactics employed by the interrogators during quizzes, but several
generalities seem to be widely held. The
Vietnamese interrogator needed to feel
that he was in control. Therefore, a
direct challenge to his authority could

not go unanswered. It was not necessary
for the POW to yield control of himself
to the interrogator but merely to convey the impression of such. For example, there were many instances when
an uncooperative POW was told by the
interrogator, "You know I can force
you to answer, don't you?" When the
POW acknowledged, "Yes, you most
likely can," the question or demand was
often dropped.
It is also generally agreed that the
interrogator had some preconceived
answers to the questions he asked concerning military matters and covert
POW activities. If the POW perceived
these desired answers to be erroneous,
he responded to reinforce this error.
However, when the Vietnamese had a
correct answer in mind, an attempt to
create doubt in the interrogator's mind
was usually a better tactic than a flat
denial of fact. Of course, these deceptive methods were not perfect, and,
when unsuccessful, the POW ended up
in ropes, on his knees holding up the
wall, sitting on the stool, or in some
other form of punishment.
Perhaps the peak experience of this
phase of a POW's life occurs when he
makes a truly maximum effort to physically resist torture. *3 It may be the first
time in his life that he musters every
ounce of physical strength, mental
courage, and determination. The feeling
of being totally consumed by this effort
is truly unique; and even when this
maximum effort, with nothing held
back, proves to be not enough, one at
least feels pure and satisfied for having
done his absolute best. Such an experience usually leaves a POW broken
and physically disabled, but is nonetheless of great psychological value to
him.

*Maslow referred to the peak experience
as ..... a self-validating self-justifying moment which carries its own intrinsic value
with it."
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Living in Groups. Life in an 8 by
8-foot cell with one, two, or three other
men is nearly as unique as living alone.
However, the absence of loneliness
makes it considerably easier to cope
with the difficulties_ associated with
small group living. The_ axiom' "misery
loves company" holds true. Close conditions, where four men eat, sleep, and
perform hygienic functions in the same
room, require some adjustment and
concession by all concerned. Individual
physical traits of snoring or body odor,
combined with personality idiosyncrasies of vulgar speech, braggadocio,
and loquaciousness, can cause strained
relations among roommates. However,
with few exceptions, U.S. officers interned in North Vietnam came to appreciate the need for compromise and
self-sacrifice for the good of the group.
Accommodation becomes a way of
life, and various means are employed to
make existence tolerable. One such
means is to routinize the events of the
day and to rigidly maintain that routine.
Planning such common events as exercising, sweeping the floor, cleaning the
cell, telling stories, and the time of
communication with other cells serves a
twofold purpose. It gives an element of
order to life and permits some control
of one's action. Otherwise a prisoner
must perform the most common daily
acts of eating, bathing, rising,. and going
to bed at a time designated by the
prison guards, and the schedule is subject to frequent unannounced changes.
The value of order and self-control is
best appreciated in the light of the
prisoner uncertain ties and required compliances.
Routine also permits a POW the
opportunity to vary his activity from
time to time in order to relieve boredom. An example would be to not
exercise on the Fourth of July or to let
another empty the ''honey bucket"
because it is the duty man's birthday.
Thus, to deviate from the routine becomes a form of celebration.

Another practice that may seem
humorous is the method by which some
POW groups parceled out food. The best
method of handling the potential
trouble of unequal food portions is to
raffle off the meals and to rely on the
"luck of the draw" method for distribution. Such procedures ultimately become a source of entertainment as
homemade dice are cast to determine
which bowl of soup each man receives.
An important element of harmony is
a sense of humor in the illegitimae non
carborundum sense. The ability to laugh
in the face of adversity is a valuable
asset. It is difficult to express how great
it feels to laugh after months of crying.
The man who finally has a roommate
following months of solitary living is
ready to laugh at anything, and the
slightest provocation prompts uncontrollable hysterics. There can always be
found an element of "sick prison
humor" in the most dire situations. One
could find a bit of humorous irony in
being tortured to write a statement that
he is being treated well. Since the
situation appears humorous even today,
perhaps the sickness still prevails.
Living together in a small prison cell
means constant association and interaction for 24 hours a day, not the mere
8 hours a day at work or at home that
most people equate with "knowing a
person." In that respect, when a POW
has the sante roommate for 2, 3, 4, and
5 years, it is safe to conclude they know
each other better than they know their
wives.
'f.he exchange of ideas that takes
place among men in a common predicament and the knowledge they gain
from each other can greatly broaden
one's perspectives. There is no need to
hide one's feelings on a subject for
image purposes because one has no
image. Roommates know each other in
their true colors; and within the sanctity
of one's small cell, the familiarity
among POW's prompts an open expression of opinions on many subjects
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that are not usually discussed at cocktail
parties or in rap sessions.
This atmosphere of frankness and the
commonality of the situation make
resistance behavior, its methods, limits,
and consequences, a popular subject for
examination. Decisions on the subject
usually represent a consensus view
rather than the dictates of the senior
member of the group. The ultimate
authority rests with the senior man, but
"having one's say" removes the resentment associated with an authoritarian
environment and more firmly commits
members of the group to a program
they have helped to formulate. However, perhaps because a man's proud
belief that his above-the-norm capability
demands higher standards, group
decisions tend to require less stringent
_cqurses o~ action than those individually
formed.
Even small group membership enables a man to project his thinking
beyond concerns for his own survival.
Resistance may now be viewed as a
contribution to the war effort as well as
individual responsibility. The adverse
effects of his compliance with the
enemy become more vivid when shared
and discussed with roommates in the
same predicament. Thus, as a man lives
in closer union with his fellow POW's,
his motives are more likely to become
less selfish.
Consensus decisions, common problems, and close quarters generate unity
and esprit among members of the small
group, a necessity if a group is to be
effective. An indication that POW's
possess these qualities and care for one
another is evidenced by the prevalent
atmosphere of gloom when a cellmate is
at quiz. Genuine concern promulgates
itself through unselfish acts of sharing,
cheering up each other, or communicating at great risk with a solo man
purely for his psychological needs.
Communication provides a sense of
group accomplishment for it demands
group effort. This function often

requires two men to visually clear the
area by watching for approaching guards
while the other two men "communicate." Each message successfully passed
produces a euphoric satisfaction within
the group. This reaction may appear
overstated, but to a group whose purpose is primarily negative, that is, not
doing something, to accomplish anything in a positive manner is significant.
To dispel the notion that U.S. POW's
held in the DRV were a group of
superhumans, it seems appropriate to
make some SUbjective observations of
isolated individual behavior within the
context of living together. Before
October of 1969, when the treatment of
POW's improved, torture abounded,
solitary confinement was common, and
very few men engaged in correspondence with the outside world. During
this period the most significant improvement in POW treatment was that torture
stopped. The POW's were then assembled in large numbers, and this
change in confinement prompted a
change of attitude in some POW's. In
this sanctuary from physical abuse,
some men discovered a boldness within
themselves and felt compelled to exhibit
ultimate resistance.
This could be called the "irons
theory" in that POW's challenged the
camp authorities to put them in leg
irons and handcuffs again. Its advocates
considered minor camp restrictions to
be harassment that should be resisted,
forgetting that for years prisoners were
humiliated by the requirement to bow
in the presence of a Vietnamese. Now in
the atmosphere of relaxed camp discipline, the "iron men" found it personally elevating to curse and ridicule a
guard in a language that guards could
barely understand, if at all. It may not
be surprising that these hard-line beliefs
did not surface until prisoners lived in
large communities where the visibility
of toughness had a larger audience. It is
worth noting that these men were not
those of senior rank with whom the
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final authority and responsibility rested.
In fact, this antagonistic behavior conflicted with the "live and let live" policy
issued by the senior officers during
periods. of relative calm.
There might have been an element of
sincerity involved, or these men might
have been motivated by the belief that
prisoners should push for as much as
they could get. The possibility also
exists that an element of "one-upmanship" or a desire to atone for less stiff
resistance in the early years of captivity
might have been present. Whatever the
motivation of these men, it was obvious
that a strong desire for self-esteem
existed among them.
Other men also followed rules for
personal conduct that was not a group
characteristic-POW's motivated to conduct themselves in a manner they believed would best represent the United
States to the North Vietnamese because
they felt the POW's were the only
Americans with whom most North Vietnamese had contact. Although prison
guards were by no means the elite of
North Vietnamese society, they would
eventually return to their villages and
answer the inevitable question: "What
were those Americans who bombed our
country really like?" In other words,
was the Vietnamese minister of propaganda really telling the truth that U.S.
pilots were bloodthirsty, arrogant, insensitive criminals?
These POW's believed that an
attitude of aloofness, support of the
U.S. Government, and resisting propaganda efforts in a professional manner
were what would ultimately gain respect
for a POW as a man. Puerile actions such
as belittling the DRV and its citizens
merely supported the Communist claims
that American POW's were the "blackest criminals in the DRV."
By November of 1970, most of the
U.S. POW's were concentrated in one
camp as a result of the U.S. commando
raid on the Son Tay POW camp. Communal living, with 20 to 50 men in a

single cell, marked the final experience
for the veteran POW who endured the
gamut of living conditions within the
DRV.
It was rather exciting to meet men
whose names and background had been
memorized but whose faces were heretofore unseen. New friendships were
born; common acquaintances and experiences were discovered; and time was
passed listening to new stories and
biographies. It was a time of high
emotion compared to an earlier drab
existence, but as one man candidly
remarked, "It is a bit depressing to hear
so many tell their stories and not hear
one happy ending."
The organization of the POW's
within this larger camp was immediately
structured in military fashion. Each cell
had a senior ranking officer (SRO) with
a staff of flight leaders. Every man was
assigned to a flight with the flights
alternating the menial housekeeping
tasks of cleaning, distributing food,
washing dishes, and clearing for communications.
Never did the Vietnamese permit
contact between prisoners in different
cells, and the senior officers were located in a rather remote section of the
camp. The establishment and protection
of communication c1~annels became
vital to the organization. Those responsible for the transmission of information
within the camp deserve a great deal of
credit for a job well done. To some men
the communication process occupied so
much of their time that it became a way
of life, a truly professional operation.
Through their efforts, a close link
was established between the leaders and
the rest of the POW's, and a rather
elaborate set of goals was promulgated
to all POW's from the senior officer and
his staff.
These goals were embodied in what
was known as the "plums." The plums
covered many areas of duty in detail
and identified our common goal. The
compendium of those plums follows: to
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support the Code of Conduct by doing
and saying nothing harmful to the U.S.
interests, to actively resist propaganda
efforts of the Vietnamese, and to work
together in order to go home with
honor. These concepts were not new to
the U.S. captives and had been implied
by individual SRO's previously. However, the assurance that everyone would
be presenting a united front to the
enemy greatly increased the group's
cohesiveness.
The organization of POW's was essentially involved with the Vietnamese in a
struggle for control. The Vietnamese
appeared to have an innate fear of an
organized group of Americans, and,
therefore, they rejected the terms of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Americans held in North Vietnam were never
granted POW status but were continually referred to as "criminals" by
the Vietnamese. By attributing any
good treatment to their own benevolence rather than to the just right of
prisoners, a sense of authority was
maintained in the minds of the Vietnamese.
When security precautions dictated
the POW's be concentrated in one camp,
the camp authorities (as they always
referred to themselves, thereby implying
control) were especially wary. The Vietnamese never recognized military rank
among POW's and attempted to exert
internal control by placing a junior
officer in charge, thus reducing the
structure and organization established
by the POW's in that room. This rather
puerile effort was eroded through universal resistance, and internal control
remained with the SRO ostensibly as
well as in fact.
The idea of control is further typified by the manner in which the Vietnamese resisted any suggestion for camp
improvement if it came from a POW,
whether or not the suggestion would be
mutually beneficial. Thus, the POW's
indirectly approached their captors to
gain improved conditions rather than

directly confronting them in a forthright manner.
The rescinding of the early regulation
that a POW bow before any Vietnamese
indicated tacit admission by the Vietnamese that control of another's body did
not constitute control of his will. With
this admission, quizzes and attempts at
political indoctrination, humorously
naive and ineffective as they might have
been, ceased altogether and propaganda
efforts lessened toward resisting POW's.
There is a distinct difference between
propaganda for the purpose of indoctrinating prisoners and propaganda released to the world in order to sway
public opinion. Indoctrination efforts
caused little concern to the POW's and
were often a source of entertainment or
a source for tidbits of news from the
outside world. However, the propaganda
directed toward world opinions could
not be predicted and therefore was a
primary target of a POW's resistance
efforts. The Hanoi parade of POW's in
1966, the circulation of grotesque pictures of pilots taken immediately after
capture, the coercing of POW's by torture to meet with foreign visitors to
Hanoi, the torturing of POW's to write
good-treatment statements, or the circulation of deceptive photographs suggesting universal good treatment of prisoners were examples of such propaganda. The POW's realized the harmful
public effects these tactics could have,
both on the U.S. war effort and on its
allies, and were motivated to resist
participation in these events to the same
degree that they resisted providing the
DRV military information. Thus, when
torture for such devious reasons ceased
in the later years, the POW felt some
sense of relief. No longer was one forced
to do these things against his will. An
understanding of this perceived exploitation and the reasons for torture
explains the bitterness of some returnees against the DRV.
Returning to the notion of control
within the camp, it should be noted that
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the prisoners had their own ideas of
control and influence. When it was felt
that the mail situation was intolerable, a
letter writing moratorium was enacted
for a period of 9 months in order to
create the impression that POW's were
no longer allowed to correspond with
their families. This would dispel any
possible misconception that the treatment of POW's was good, and it was
hoped subsequent pressure on the DRV
would prompt the Vietnamese to distribute more mail.
On another occasion, prisoners were
forbidden to hold religious services, to
form a choir, or to have any POW speak
in front of the group. This' restriction
against religious services was met with a
unified POW demonstration in which
350 POW's throughout the camp started
to yell and sing in unison. The reaction
of the Vietnamese was greater than had
been anticipated-they actually thought
a revolt was in progress. Several senior
POW officers were taken out of the
camp, and the camp discipline was
tightened. For several days the atmosphere within the camp was tense, but
eventually the right to hold church
services was won. Similar struggles for
camp control, however, continued until
the POW's were released.
Even though a man is dedicated to
group goals, he remains very much an
individual. Manifestations of this individuality come in many forms such as
the power need of those who controlled
the communications4 or those who
were prestige motivated and thus voluntarily filled the thankless roles of education officer, entertainment officer,
cigarette control officer, doctor, or
chaplain when their rank did not warrant a role of leadership. 5
A few within the group could not
resign themselves to accept camp improvement for fear such acceptance
would compromise resistance. Therefore, if a prisoner accepted any form of
improved treatment, such as writing a
Christmas card home or the use of a

pencil and paper, he would not be
performing his duty.
Perhaps reluctance to accept camp
improvements in the DRV prisons could
be explained by Maslow's metagrumble
theory6 where such qualms could be
present only in a truly self-actualizing
man as he strove for perfection and thus
rejected any compromise. A more likely
explanation would be that the POW's
possessed a basic distrust of the Vietnamese and their motives-an attitude
not without foundation. The North
Vietnamese made propaganda a way of
life and used religious services, medical
treatment, and POW mail as bribes or
exploitation. Small wonder that a popular expression among POW's was,
"Beware of Gooks bearing gifts. "
To a degree, attitudes within the
formal POW organization -a source for
POW motivation -changed during the
final years. Motivation continued to
become more altruistic or patriotic than
egoistic within the POW organization,
situationally enhanced by large group
living. The managing and protection of a
united organization provided an atmosphere that enabled thinking to be more
long range and altruistic. A certain
security was felt and a better opportunity was provided to perform as
honorable men, as outlined in the organizational objectives. Could it be that
the decision to support and participate
in the activities of the large POW group
was derived from agreement with its
goals, or was it a desire to gain the
personal protection afforded by group
membership? There did exist the moral
obligation to fulfill one's contract as a
military officer. Perhaps a man was
motivated by pure love of his cO!lntry,
or was it a hatred of a philosophy so
alien and detrimental to his survival?
Was the POW's philosophy pragmatic or
idealistic?
It appeared that the POW was duty
motivated and tended to be more altruistic as he became more actively a
part of the larger POW organization.
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The ego-centered pride motivation of
initial captive days expanded to include
consideration of other POW's and ideals.
However, embodied within that duty
were as many factors as there are
caveats in the label of patriotism.
It has been stated before that POW's
resisted making statements harmful to
the United States and its allies. But that
is not to say the POW's agreed 100
percent with all aspects of the war in
Vietnam and the way in which it was
conducted. The group of U.S. POW's in
North Vietnam represented both liberal
and conservative political philosophies,
but there was universal agreement that
the POW camp was not the place from
which to air those views to the world. A
POW had an obligation-yes, duty-to
conduct himself in the manner expected
of a POW as embodied in the spirit of
the Code of Conduct.
It was also the duty of a POW to
remain a POW until released through
government channels. Such reasoning
supports a finding that a near universal
rejection of the early releases by the
DRV of a few officer POW's* from
1968 to 1972 was a cohesive factor. The
criticism of those accepting parole
ranged from vocal condemnation to
charitable doubt, but there was no one
who defended the acceptance of early
release as honorable behavior for an
officer. The determination to avoid such
stigma was a binding influence among
resisting prisoners.
One last observation is important.
POW's in general felt that they had
invested a long time serving as POW's in
the war. Most of these men did not
want their position undercut through
the U.S. Government conceding defeat
or its inability to win. Hence, the men

*Of the POW's who were released early,
only one man went home with the permission
of the senior American officer in camp. No
stigma was attached to this seaman's release
by any POW. His resistance had been exemplary from capture to release.

clung to their position of resistance to
the last day. Some might call this
irrational or just plain stubborn. But
many POW's have said, after having
spent more than 6 years in prison, they
were willing to spend another year if it
meant the difference between walking
out of Vietnam or crawling out. They
meant it!
The comparison of POW communal
life to standard group behavior theories
is enormous. No doubt many aspects of
prisoner existence will fill books of the
future. Since these men will be collectively evaluated, as were the Korean
POW's, it does seem appropriate to
conduct an examination of the Vietnam
POW organizational effectiveness. An
appropriate criteria by which to measure the effectiveness of any group is
contained in the Field Theory of Lewin,
The Interaction Process Analysis of
Bales, and The Human Group Theory. 7
These men have designated many factors that influence an organization's
productivity, but some are more germane to this discussion than others.
A common factor for a successful
group in the theories of Bales and
Homan is the requirement of positive
interaction. The interaction among
people who had lived in confined quarters had been present whether desired or
not. A characteristic of American POW's
in the DRV had been their willingness
to promulgate to all fellow captives
personally tragic or triumphant prison
experiences. Accounts of torture sessions, quizzes, or personal thoughts
were related regardless of whether a
man's participation had been a point of
pride or shame. Such revelations had
helped others to learn vicariously and
represented nearly perfect interaction.
Events that occurred throughout the
camp were transmitted to everyone.
Sometimes listening to a POW sweep the
hall or the camp courtyard with the
tapcode rhythm was slightly reminiscent
of listening to the evening news events
of the day.
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Another standard of groups is contained in the writings of Lewin 8 who held
cohesion to be the key element of a
successful group and tied it directly to
the productivity of the body. 'rhe satisfactions, the degree of closeness, the
amount of pride, the ability to meet
crises, and the willingness to be frank and
honest in expressing ideas among members of the group were some criteria
needed for cohesiveness. Lewin's concept
of cohesiveness, lacking among Korean
POW's, provided an apt description of the
Vietnam war POW's. The common goals,
united actions, and other ipstances
previously cited support this contention.
The most comprehensive set of
standards for a successful group was
stated by Shepherd.9 He listed five
features by which to measure group
effectiveness:
• Objectives: Is its purpose the
same as that of its members?
• Role Differentiation: Does each
member know what is required of him?

• Values and Norms: Is that which
is desired and that which is expected
clear?
• Membership: Is the membership
clear-cut and heterogeneous?
• Communication: No one withholds relevant information.
All of these features as they apply to
the U.S. prisoner organization in Vietnam have been examined within this
paper. It is left to the reader to pass
judgment on the organized group's effectiveness.
For my part,· I would like to stress
again that the high standards of
behavior the U.S. POW's demanded of
themselves were largely due to the
personal integrity of these men. From
one who has spent considerable time in
their midst, I have nothing but the
highest regard for them as military
officers. America is fortunate to have
been represented by such a select
group under the most trying of circumstances.
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